This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
+ *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
+ *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
+ *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at `http://books.google.com/`

Gustafson - The United States and the Panama Canal - 1882

US
1680
12

45 1680.12


SIGILLUM ACADEMIAE HARVARDIANAE IN NOV ANG
CHRISTO ET ECCLESIAE
VE RI TAS
HARVARD
COLLEGE
LIBRARY
FROM THE FUND
IN MEMORY OF
ELLIS
LORING
DRESEL
CLASS OF 1887

THE UNITED STATES

AND

THE PANAMA CANAL.

BY

AXEL GUSTAFSON
(*Of New York City, U.S.A.*).

LONDON:
WILLIAM RIDGWAY, 169, PICCADILLY, W.
1882.

US 1680.12
V

HARVARD
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
OCT 19 1944

Dexter Fund

THE UNITED STATES AND THE PANAMA CANAL.

"Right and Duty are twin brothers; they are like the two electric flames appearing at the yard-arms of the Mediterranean, called by the ancient mariners Castor and Pollux. When both are visible, a fair and pleasant course is expected, but one alone portends stormy mischief. . . . . Liberty, without conscientiousness of action, rights, without acknowledged obligations necessarily lead to absolutism, first to Democratic and through it generally to monarchic."

FRANCIS LIEBER.

THE International Scientific Congress of Paris, May 15th—26th, 1879, composed of ninety-eight eminent geographers and other scientists, merchants, naval officers and engineers from England, France, Holland, Italy, Mexico, Russia, Sweden and the United States, &c., decided by seventy-eight to eight — twelve not voting — that "*Le Congrès estime que le percement d'un canal interocéanique à niveau constant, si désirable dans l'intérêt du commerce et de la navigation, est possible; et que ce canal maritime pour répondre aux facilités indispensables d'accés et d'utilisation que doit offrir avant tout un passage de ce genre, doit être dirigé du golfe de Limon à la baie de Panama.*"

The funds deemed necessary for the accomplish-

ment of this project have been guaranteed. Still fresh in mind is the brilliant success of the subscription opened Dec. 7th, 8th, and 9th, 1880, when, on M. Lesseps' call for six hundred million francs, he was offered twelve hundred millions! Now the work is being pushed forward with energy by thousands of workmen suitably equipped, cared for by the best physicians, and guided by some of the ablest engineers of the age, such as Armand Reclus, commander in the French navy; Mr. Dirks, chief engineer of the Waterstaat (dyke system) of Holland, who conducted the building of the great Amsterdam Canal; United States Col. of engineers, Totten, who constructed the Panama railroad in conjunction with Colonel Trautwine; United States General Wright, former chief of General Sherman's staff; M. Bontan, a prominent engineer in the *corps des mines* of France; and M. Hersent, the famous contractor for the works on the Suez Canal, the diminution of Danubian floods, and the enlargement of the Antwerp harbour. And the presiding spirit of the work is M. Ferdinand Marie de Lesseps, the man, now seventy-seven years old, who, after more than ten years' struggle with scientists and engineers, against Turkey and England, in the teeth of Lord Palmerston's and Stratford de Redcliffe's official veto to the enterprise, dug the Suez Canal through the "shifting sands" of Egypt.

He has said that the Panama project offers less

difficulties than did the construction of the Suez Canal; that he has greater confidence in its success than he had in the Suez undertaking; he has promised to build it and to open it to traffic in 1888.

If constructed with the goodwill and guarantee of the great commercial nations, the canal cannot fail to become a blessing to the world's commerce and a great financial success. Most of the rapidly increasing trade between Europe and the Pacific shores, would prefer a passage—of at the most but two days' length—through the canal, assisted largely by the gulf stream, in employing that route and saving three thousand miles, to the tedious, stormy and dangerous rounding of Cape Horn. The yearly increasing trade of Japan and China with the East Coast of the Americas, with Cuba and the West Indies, as well as with a great portion of Europe, would largely patronize the canal, and the greater portion of the traffic between the Atlantic and Pacific shores in both Americas would find the Isthmian canal route advantageous above all others.

North Canadian commerce between both its shores and the immense South American trade of Rio Janeiro and Buenos Ayres with Valparaiso and Lima, would not generally use the canal, but the great bulk of the world's trade would prefer to pass between the two Americas.

The official estimates made by Captain Davies,

who was commissioned by the United States in 1866 to calculate the probable yearly traffic on an adequate transisthmian canal, fix it at about four million tons yearly, and the annual savings from the shortening of the ordinary route, to over ninety millions of dollars.

The calculations of M. de Lesseps and his chiefs, for business on the Panama Canal from the day it is opened to the world's traffic, were reported at the great Delmonic banquet given in New York in honour of M. Ferdinand de Lesseps by Herr Justin Dirks, then president of the Lesseps staff, who said:—

"In basing my calculations on the well-known report of M. Lavasseur, I find for the trade of New York per year:—

	Tons.	Saving in distance.	Saving in millions of ton-miles.
To China	321,000	3,600	1,155
Japan	170,000	3,100	867
Australian Archipelago .	133,000	900	119
Australia (Melbourne) .	75,000	2,100	157
British Columbia . .	20,000	6,450	129
San Francisco . . .	644,000	6,600	4,250
Peru	644,000	4,950	3,187
Chili	644,000	2,550	1,642
Western Mexico and other Western ports . .	631,000	6,600	4,172
Sandwich Islands . .	86,000	5,700	490
The figures for Europe are:—			
China and Japan . .	387,000	1,440	558
Totals . . .	3,755,000	—	16,730

"From information given by the European companies of navigation which have about twenty steamers running, the value of one thousand ton-miles may be reckoned, including wages, food, coals, insurance and such expenses, to be $1. If this be correct, the yearly saving for the general trade of the world will be $1,750,000 when the canal is built. These figures are based on the trade of 1878, so there may be allowed a good percentage for increase during the construction of the canal. Moreover, the average speed of vessels along the old and new routes was considered the same, though the speed will be greater in the direction of the canal, the new route generally crossing a lesser percentage of the trade-winds, and having no more to meet the difficulties of the capes. Finally, the cargoes of vessels will be shorter time out of trade, and the loss caused by damages of long sea voyages will be reduced. Taking all these into account, I place the value of the Panama Canal at the period of its opening at $30,000,000 per year, representing at 5 per cent. a capital of $600,000,000."*

* In his able little work, entitled "L'Amerique Centrale et le Canal de Panama," the Vte. H. de Bizemont says :—

"Pour connaître ce qu'il sera en 1889, date de l'achèvement des travaux, . . . il suffit de remarquer que le commerce du Pacifique a doublé en quinze ans, de 1860 à 1876. La progression serait encore plus forte si l'on s'en rapportait à ce fait que le transit du chemin de fer de l'isthme, d'après le rapport du consul de l'Angleterre à Panama, s'est accru en

Thus, nearly four centuries after the first attempt to find a waterway across the Isthmus, more than three hundred years after the first survey for constructing one, and just a hundred years since Thomas Jefferson wrote,—"I am assured by Burgoyne that a survey was made (by the Spaniards), that the canal appeared very practicable, and that the idea was suppressed for political reasons altogether,"—we may look to see the ships from all parts of the world meeting and passing each other between the green banks where one vast continent has been changed into two vast islands in the interests of universal progress.

It would seem, therefore, that before this great event takes place the United States must definitely determine their attitude in the matter.

It is noteworthy that, excepting in 1849-50, the

1878 de 20 p. 100 par rapport à l'année précédente. On peut donc comptor, sans criante de déception, sur un accroisement annuel de 5 p. 100, ce qui pour 1889 donnerait un trafic de 7,249,000 tonnes. . . . . Le Congrès de Paris a fixé le tarif du prix de passage par le canal interocéanique à 15 francs per tonne métrique. La recette annuel pour six millions de tonnes sera donc de 90 millions. En admettant 1200 millions pour la dépense totale de construction les intérêts et les frais d'exploitation et d'entretien capitalisés, c'est un revenu de 7½ p. 100 qui serait assuré, dès le début, à l'enterprise. Ainsi la nouvelle œuvre de M. de Lesseps, non seulement dépassera la première en grandeur, mais encore promet de développer bien plus largement le commerce du monde et la richesse publique."

United States Government did not until 1866 take more than ordinary interest in the isthmian canal explorations. After the falling through in 1848 of the Garella railway project, an American company, was formed which built the Panama Colon Railway 1849-55. But the canal projects did not meet with equal success. United States General Bernhard examined the Tehuantepec route in 1850, while two American engineers, Childs and Fay, were exploring the Nicaragua line. In 1852 Mr. Kelley, a rich New York banker, sent the celebrated Panama Railroad engineer, Trautwine, to make investigations as to the interoceanic canal. In 1853-54 occurred the ill-fated exploration of Lieutenant Strain, and in 1858 General Michler examined the Humboldt Bay and Atrato River route. In 1864 Mr. Kelley again dispatched an exploring expedition to the Isthmus, but no definite result was obtained.

The Peruvians offered large pecuniary aid to Colombia for the building of a transisthmian canal, and in 1866 the United States, on General Grant's recommendation, concluded to send a monster expedition to the Isthmus to examine into and report upon all proposed and possible transisthmian canal routes.

This exploring mission started in 1870. It was composed of naval officers, superior engineers, and astronomers, with a large staff of assistants, protected by troops and sailors, and commanded

by Captain Schufeldt, Commanders Selfridge, Lull and Crosman, and naval Lieutenant Collins, and worked on the Isthmus three years.

Captain Schufeldt examined the Tehuantepec route; Commander Lull that of Nicaragua and Panama; Commander Selfridge the San Blas; and Lieutenant Collins the Atrato-Napipi route. They all proposed loch canals, and no proposal was regarded as conclusive.

An International Geographic Congress, which met in 1875 at Paris, decided to continue the canal investigations, and a committee for the purpose was formed in 1876, presided over by General Türr—principal promoter, with M. Lesseps, of the just commenced Corinthian Canal. At an early stage of its labours, the Tehuantepec route was discarded, and as the Colombian routes had only been superficially examined by the American mission of 1870-73, it was decided to send Lieutenant Wyse and Engineer Reclus to complete these explorations. After two years of investigation and negotiations with the Colombian Government, Lieutenant Wyse obtained (May, 1878) a charter for building the canal.

This caused dissatisfaction in the United States, and counter projects in Darien, Tehuantepec and Nicaragua were vigorously pressed. The Nicaraguan scheme was for several reasons specially bolstered up, and for some time General Grant was president of a company formed to carry out this

scheme. Then came the great International Scientific Congress of 1879, at which the projects of Admiral Ammen and Engineer Menochal in Nicaragua, as well as all the other United States' propositions, were dismissed and the Wyse-Reclus plan adopted.

Hardly had the United States representatives returned from this Congress, when their spokesman, Admiral Ammen, in his official report, stigmatized the Paris decision as a French scheme to get control of the canal; and shortly after, General Burnside introduced in the Senate a resolution reaffirming what he called the Monroe Doctrine, "that the nations of this Continent are not to be considered subjects for future domination by any European power; that the United States could not regard without serious disquietude attempts by any European power to establish under their protection or domination a ship canal across the Isthmus of Darien, which action they could regard in no other light than as a manifestation of unfriendly disposition towards the United States." This resolution was, however, referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, who shelved it. The President and Secretary of State declared they felt little interest in the subject, being convinced that the Lesseps route was impracticable, both by nature and from lack of funds. But the arrival of a brigade of engineers and workmen in the fall of 1879, the splendid success of the December subscription and

especially the departure for the Isthmus of M. de Lesseps in December, with a commission of eminent engineers from Colombia, France and Holland, once more roused the United States, and President Hayes, in his annual message of 1879, called attention to the fact that "the question of an interoceanic canal has recently assumed a new and important aspect, and is now under discussion with the Central American countries through whose territory the canal, by the Nicaragua route, would have to pass."

In January, 1880, M. de Lesseps, in the name of the "*Compagnie Universelle du canal interocéanique*," took formal possession of the canal territory granted by Colombia, and on January 10th, his little six-years' old daughter, Fernande, fired the mine which struck the cap from the Culebra, the highest peak in the line of the canal.

M. de Lesseps then visited the United States, and while there received from the technical committee their published report (February, 1880), perfectly demonstrating the feasibility of the proposed route; and after explaining exhaustively the purely commercial nature of the enterprise to Congress and the public, he returned to France.

The White House and Capital have not been silent spectators of the work on the Isthmus, but M. de Lesseps has been no more deterred by official lightnings from Washington than he formerly was by the flashes from London. And

now a painful phenomenon is presented: while the crowned heads and cabinets, the great military powers of Europe,—while Czar Alexander and Emperor Wilhelm, Baron de Giers, Prince Bismarck and M. de Fréycinet, no less than Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Herbert Spencer are labouring in the interests of peace, the United States, the cradle of Liberty, the home of Industry and peace, resounds with martial mutterings.

From Atlantic to Pacific shores there rings to-day the foreign-sounding catchword of "American Interests."

One might almost suppose that the volcanic fluids of the earth have their parallelism in the war ardours of man; that when accustomed craters cease to erupt, the pent convulsion must rend the crust upon a new scene.

Up to the present time the official warfare of the United States against the Panama Canal project may be said to have been carried out on two lines and by two allied divisions.

The Presidents Hayes, Garfield and Arthur, and their Secretaries of State, Evarts and Blaine, who may be said to form the first division of the Opposition, have based their objections to the canal chiefly on the Bogota treaty of 1846; while the United States Congress, the big Atlantic and Pacific railroad and steamship companies who form the second division, seek to rally the martial spirit

of the United States against the canal under the banner of the "Monroe Doctrine."

Both divisions co-operate for the abrogation of all compacts opposed to the claim that for the American continents the United States is the "honest broker," and that if a twin sister of the Suez-ian "Bosphorus" is born between the two American continents, the offspring shall be under the guardianship and protection of the United States.

In the annual message last December, President Arthur assured Congress that the government had not been "unmindful of the solemn obligations imposed upon it by the compact of 1846 with Colombia as the sovereign mistress of the territory crossed by the proposed canal;" dwelt feelingly on the ingratitude of Colombia in not resting content in the protection to the proposed canal afforded by the United States, adding: "This government had learned that Colombia had proposed to European Powers to join in a guarantee of the proposed Panama Canal—a guarantee which would be in direct contravention of our obligation as the sole guarantor of the integrity of the Colombian territory and the neutrality of the Canal itself."

The Nicaragua project so warmly commended by President Hayes only the preceding year had made no headway, while the promises of M. de Lesseps were being fulfilled one by one

with clocklike regularity, and President Arthur's message reads as a scarcely veiled threat of forcible interference with the canal work, should all other means to that end prove ineffectual.

But the treaty of Bogota between the United States and Colombia signed in 1846 and ratified in 1848, which is brought forward as a pretext for interference with the canal, is no longer in force, and it is more than questionable if the United States themselves did not break this treaty years ago, previous to the date of its legal expiration. By the terms of the treaty, it was to remain in force for twenty years, after which date it was terminable at any time by either party on a twelvemonth's notice. It granted exactly the same conditions, rights and privileges for crossing the Isthmus to United States' as to Granadian citizens, and in return for the "enjoyment of these advantages," the United States guaranteed "positively and efficaciously to New Granada the perfect neutrality of the Isthmus . . . . and the rights of sovereignty and property which New Granada has and possesses over said territory." From the very wording therefore of this treaty—which reads almost like an outburst of gratitude for signal favours—it is plain that the United States did not at that time regard the treaty as a poor bargain.

If subsequently it was found to be unprofitable, the United States has ever since 1868 had the

easy means of relief at hand, provided by the treaty itself, and if not choosing to avail herself of these means, why should she now groan under the weight of the "great obligations" imposed?

But did not the United States in fact dissolve this treaty in 1862? It will be remembered that in that year the victorious rebel chief Mosquera, whose object was the overthrow of the New Granadian Confederation, had sent part of his forces to occupy the Isthmus; and the helpless Governor of Panama, in virtue of the treaty of 1846, appealed through Minister Herran to the United States for help. There could hardly have been a clearer case for United States' interference in favour of the Colombian Government on the ground of the Bogota treaty, yet Secretary Seward did not respond, but in a memorable dispatch (July 10, 1862) to United States' Minister Adams at London, he wrote that the United States had "no interest in the matter different from the other maritime powers," and he instructed Mr. Adams "to submit the matter to Earl Russell, as Mr. Dayton will be likewise instructed to confer with M. Thouvenel. The points to be remembered are: 1. Whether any proceeding in the matter shall be adopted by the United States. 2. What shall be the force and extent of the aid to be rendered to the Granadian Confederation. 3. Whether these governments (England and France) will unite with the United States in guaranteeing the safety

of the transit (Panama railroad) and the authority of the Granadian Confederation. . . . . I hardly need say that this government is not less anxious to avoid any such independent or hasty action in the matter as would indicate a desire for exclusive or special advantages in New Granada than the British Government can be that we shall abstain from such a course."

If it be contended that this act on the part of the United States did not *de facto* abrogate the treaty, it is in some quarters considered that the required twelvemonth's notice was given to the United States by the Colombian minister in 1871. Even the fierce anti-Lesseps New York *World*, in its issue of January 6, 1881, editorially considers it "a serious question whether the Columbian minister did not on the 15th April, 1871," give the required notice for terminating the treaty. Whatever was the case previously, last year the Columbian Congress instructed its president to formally give to the United States the required twelvemonth's notice, so that during this present year (1882) the Bogota treaty of 1846 ought to die and be buried whether the United States attends the funeral or not.

Secretary Seward, who in 1862 made so humiliating a surrender—at the discretion of England and France—of the United States treaty obligations towards Colombia, endeavoured in 1868 (the very year of the legal expiration of the Bogota

treaty) to force on Colombia a convention virtually destroying her sovereignty. He demanded that the United States should have absolute right to make surveys for a transisthmian canal, and, if it were found feasable, to build and control its entire management at all times for one hundred years; Colombia being required to promise "not to undertake or allow the opening of any other interoceanic canal or of any new railway through their territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean without the consent of the United States." Mr. Seward's anxiety to avoid such action as would seem to indicate a desire for exclusive or special advantages in New Granada had appreciably abated; but in 1862 the United States were sorely pressed in the civil war, while in 1868 they had strangled secession and were again strong.

Essentially similar attempts on Colombia's rights in regard to the construction of an interoceanic canal have since been repeatedly made. As recently as 1881, the United States made treaty proposals to Colombia, providing that "war ships and military convoys of the United States" should "pass through the canal in time of peace and in time of war without paying dues," and that the two governments should select on the Isthmus "sites for the establishment of forts, arsenals and coaling stations."

By this last stipulation the United States virtually required from Colombia a *post factum*

sanction of their breach of treaty. But this proposal, like all the preceding ones, was not accepted. To-day, therefore, no treaty relations exist between the United States and the republic of Colombia, bearing on the canal projects, and the right of the United States to interfere with the Lesseps canal in Colombia appears equal to its right to meddle with the canal works just commenced on the Corinthian Isthmus. Broadly speaking, no treaty, no matter how definite and firm between two parties can have any claim to international respect when paramount interests of a third or a fourth party in the case are ignored.

The second division of the opposition to the plan of M. de Lesseps, in the United States, advocates as we have said the Monroe Doctrine. In March, 1880, just at the time of M. de Lesseps' visit to Washington, President Hayes issued a special ultra-American canal message to Congress, in which, though any actual mention of the Monroe Doctrine is discreetly avoided, the official signal for its revival is undoubtedly given.

"The policy of this country," said the President, "is a canal under American control. . . . It will be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our Pacific shores, and *virtually a part of the coast line of the United States.*"

Lord Granville admirably comments on this remarkable pretension, in his dispatch to Mr. West, January 7th, 1882, as follows: "Her

Majesty's Government cannot believe that it would be agreeable or convenient to any South American State, through which the canal may pass, to find itself called upon to admit a foreign power to construct and garrison in its territory a succession of fortresses of increasing magnitude designed to oppose such attempts, even though that foreign power be a neighbouring one and situated upon the same continent; and when the claim to do this is accompanied by a declaration, that the United States will always insist on treating the waterway which shall unite the two oceans, as 'part of her coast line,' it is difficult to imagine that the States to which the territory lying between that waterway and the United States belongs, can practically retain as independent a position as that which they now enjoy."

To properly comprehend the original Monroe Doctrine and thereby better appreciate the nature and importance of the political instrument into which it is now being transformed by the Monroe Doctrine revivalists, it is essential to recall the general features of the time of President Monroe, and the reasons for the declaration which has since borne his name.

In 1823, when James Monroe was President of the United States, it numbered about nine millions of inhabitants. Great Britain held still larger territory of the North American Continent, while Russia and France possessed vast domains on both

sides of the young republic, and Spain, so lately deprived of her rule over the larger part of South and Central America, was embittered by the United States' recognition of the independence of the Spanish republics.*

The Holy Alliance [Russia, Prussia, France and Austria] combined, after the overthrow of Bonaparte, to sustain and extend monarchism and put down popular institutions, had been successful in meddling with Spain, and now promised to assist her in the recovery of her revolted American colonies.

Great Britain—till then a faithful ally of the Holy Alliance—took alarm at this proposal, and Mr. Canning, then Foreign Secretary, informed Mr. Rush, United States Minister to the Court of St. James, of the plot, offering to oppose it in union with the United States.

This negotiation occurred in August, 1823, and Great Britain's overtures of co-operation against the threatened danger were joyfully received by the United States. The immediate result was seen

* The long and terrible struggle between Spain and her large colonies in America was virtually ended. Rio de la Plata became independent in 1816; Chili, in April 1818; New Granada in Aug. 1818; Guatemala, embracing the fine central American states, in Sept. 1821; Venezuela in Nov. 1823. In Mexico the Spaniards were making hopeless efforts to hold fort San Juan D'Ulloa, which surrendered two weeks after President Monroe's address. The only state partially held by Spain, was Bolivia, which did not secure her independence until 1825.

in Mr. Canning's energetic dispatch to Spain, discouraging all further attempts to subjugate the colonies, and inviting Spain to be the first European power to acknowledge their independence. The American companion document to Mr. Canning's dispatch was the special declaration of policy included in the annual message of President Monroe, December 2nd, 1823, and since become known as the "Monroe Doctrine." The substance of this doctrine is contained in the following verbatim quotations from "the Senate Documents" of that year:—

"The political system of the allied powers is essentially different from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments; and to the defence of our own, which has been achieved with the loss of so much blood and treasure and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. *We owe it therefore to candour, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.*

"*With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and we shall not interfere.*

"*But with the governments who have declared*

their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. In the war between these new governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition (1821). *To this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.*"

If ever a public declaration seemed to be specially made for a special occasion the so-called Monroe Doctrine is a self-evident instance, and it is surely no exaggeration to say, that every presidential message delivered to Congress has contained some passage better adapted for use as a principle of State policy. Indeed, the very same message which incorporates the Monroe declaration contains statements evidently intended for permanentobser vance, but which manifestly would not suit the modern Monroe doctrinists. This, for example:—

"Our policy in regard to Europe is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government *de facto* as the

legitimate government for us, to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none."

What is the plain interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine?

1. The United States declare that because of essential dissimilarities in the political systems of the Old and New Worlds, any attempts [rumours of which had reached the United States] by the Holy Alliance to establish any monarchy anywhere on the American continents would be regarded by the United States as "dangerous to peace and safety."

The Holy Alliance exists no more, the reasons for which it existed are of the past, Europe has enough to do to maintain her own monarchies without trying to spread that system abroad, and the United States has, moreover, grown beyond all danger from without on that score.

2. As the United States had respected and would respect European colonies and dependencies on American soil, so they would expect from every friendly European Power abstention from attempts on the liberty and independence of the newly formed Spanish republics in South and Central America, whose independence the United States recognized.

It was but a fair demand of *quid pro quo* called

forth by Mr. Canning's signal of danger, and offer of English support for averting it, and by the necessity of encouraging the threatened and exhausted republics. The Holy Alliance broke up, and as England with other powers, lastly Spain, recognized the Spanish republics which yearly became more settled and firmly established, the danger of European interference in their concerns gradually disappeared, and in the same ratio of course the legitimate applicability of the second portion of the Monroe Doctrine disappears also.

There is still another passage claimed as a part of the Monroe Doctrine by its modern apostles, which has for some reason been excluded from the official documents of the Senate. This passage lays it down as "a principle in which the United States are involved, that the American continents by the free and independent position which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power."

As this passage nearly produced a rupture both with England and Russia, besides being then as now, historically and geographically incorrect—as it flatly contradicts the assertion in the Monroe Doctrine of non-interference with existing colonies and dependencies, and as it was proved to be neither the expression of the concensus of President and Cabinet, as all the other portions of the

doctrine were, nor the authoritative expression of President Monroe's own views, but an insertion by Mr. Adams—then Secretary of State—on his own responsibility, *after* the other portions had been unanimously accepted, and without the sanction or knowledge of any other member of the Cabinet;—and as Mr. Adams in his "Lives of James Madison and James Monroe," in explaining this very passage, says it was to announce "that measures had been taken to determine by amicable negotiations the respective rights and interests of the United States on one part, and the governments of Russia and Great Britain on the other, upon the north-west coast of the American continent," it seems quite clear that it referred exclusively to negotiations for a definite settlement of the protracted Oregon controversy, and that for each and all the reasons cited could hardly be claimed as a safe foundation for a permanent United States' foreign State policy!

But in order to further show how entirely the Monroe Doctrine was a measure of those times and for those times only; how truly it was the outcome both of fear of the Holy Alliance and of hope with England's aid to thwart it, and also to show how little effect the declaration itself had on the purpose of the Holy Alliance, I may cite from the identical note to the Powers [December 26, 1823], in which the Spanish Foreign Minister, the Conde de Ofaliat proposed a General Conference at Paris. "The

king has determined," so ran his note, "to devote his particular attention to the affairs in Spanish America," and trusts that in this he may "justly calculate on the assistance of his dear allies."

The crisis had come, but England, and at no small risk to herself, refused to attend, and the Congress came to naught. It was, therefore, England's refusal to participate in the proposed conference and not the Monroe Doctrine which withheld the allies from attempting the liberty of the Spanish republics, and possibly afterwards that of the United States.

Yet further, in proof of the intimate union between England and the United States throughout that critical period, I may quote from the grand speech of James Mackintosh [June, 1824] on the occasion of his presenting to the House a petition from the City of London, asking England's recognition of the Spanish American republics.

Speaking of the common aim of England and the United States, which he "hoped might be for ever united in the cause of justice and liberty," Sir James said:—"The two great English commonwealths both declare that if Spain should be converted into one of the fangs of the Holy Alliance, that beast of prey shall not be suffered to plunge it into the heart of America, nor spread the baneful influence over the new continent under which the old already groans; that English liberty will resist it in America; that English liberty will resist it in Europe."

Thus history clearly demonstrates:—

1. That in those days the republican institutions and even the independence of the United States were in great danger from despotism; that, thanks to England, the United States were forewarned and the plot thwarted, and that by the combined efforts of England and the United States the dragon of the Holy Alliance was dispatched.

2. That the "Monroe Doctrine," framed in response to England's danger signal and offer of support, and worded with the wisdom and care so characteristic of President Monroe, formally recognizing "existing colonies and dependencies of European Powers," and making a like recognition for the newly independent republics a test condition of friendship, was virtually neither more nor less than the American part of the great Anglo-Saxon protest against the proposed crusade of despotism upon constitutional government, and was purely and wholly promulgated to this end. *a.* The United States' recognition of European possessions in America does not quite seem to be a darkly pleasant way of stating that Europe "has no business on the American continent." *b.* The United States' declared readiness to protect the independence of the new-born Spanish republics against force, while observing absolute neutrality as to all peaceful negotiations between Spain and her former colonies, can also scarcely be construed into meaning that the American republics existed only for the use and pleasure and by the grace of

the United States; that, for example, if a sovereign State like Colombia should decide to grant to a purely commercial company organized under a Colombian charter, the necessary rights for the construction of an interoceanic canal across her territory, the United States can hardly cite the Monroe Doctrine in justification for their interference with such an enterprise. c. That the United States having framed the Monroe Doctrine at the instance of England and in reliance on her support,—a reliance which events justified,—cannot appeal to the doctrine in support of a policy of isolation from and opposition to England.

Attempts have been made on several occasions to revive the Monroe Doctrine, the last previous to the present one being made in 1848. The numerous Indians of Yucatan, exasperated by the tyranny of the few whites, had commenced a war of extermination on their oppressors. The colonists, thus threatened with destruction, appealed to the United States as well as to other Powers for help. President Polk, in a message to Congress, said, that "while it is not my purpose to recommend any measure with a view to the acquisition of the dominion and sovereignty of Yucatan, yet, according to our established policy, we could not consent to a transfer of this dominion and sovereignty either to Spain, Great Britain, or any other European Power. In the language of President Monroe, 'we should consider any attempt on their

part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.' "

Although at that time the United States were strong, with no Power to say them nay, Europe being in the birth-throes of revolution, this insidious appeal to the Monroe Doctrine met with a scathing reception in the Senate, where Senator Calhoun, the only survivor of the Monroe Cabinet, exposed the false use which was being made of Mr. Monroe's words, and so earnestly warned the country of the disastrous consequences that the subject was forthwith dropped.

The *quietus* thus given to mischievous interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine ought to have been sufficient to lay this troublesome spectre, but Mr. Polk's attempt at galvanization has been thrown entirely in the shade by the modern expansion patent just taken out upon it by the anti-canal leaders. In the "Rig-Vedas" of four or five thousand years ago, the Indian poet lets his mightiest God say: "To the Aryans have I given the earth."

In the United States it has almost come to it that the Monroe doctrinists put in the mouth of their great authority the words: "To the United States have I given the earth." That this is by no means the exaggeration it might appear will be seen from the following quotation from an article contributed by a United States Congressman and exambassador to Vienna, to the *North American*

Review for December, 1881. The object of his article, the writer states at the outset, is "to show the later expansion of the principle" of the Monroe Doctrine.

He startles his readers by announcing that Mr. Jefferson, in his advice to President Monroe regarding the Message of 1823, "indicated a broader sense" in which it was to be applied by posterity.

"Mr. Jefferson," he says, "advised Mr. Monroe —facing a possible war for the principle—to establish the American system of keeping out of our land all foreign Powers, of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations, and to oppose most especially their transfer [of the Spanish American possessions] to any Power by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any other way." To appreciate the character of this quotation it is only necessary to supply here the passage as it is in Mr. Jefferson's letter.

After advising a "protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations by the interference of anyone in the internal affairs of another . . . by the lawless alliance calling itself Holy." Mr. Jefferson proceeds—"I would honestly join in the declaration proposed that we aim not at the acquisition of any of these [the Spanish] positions, that *we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangement between them and the mother country*, but that we will oppose with all our means the

forcible interposition of any other Power by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any way under any form or pretext. . . . Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves with the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs."

If we simply keep in mind the historical environs of the time as already touched upon we see at once that the second point in Mr. Jefferson's letter was dictated by fear of the Alliance, and this becomes clearer from what follows.

After claiming the necessity of a separate State-system for the United States, in order that she may become the domicile of freedom while Europe "is labouring to become a domicile of despotism," Mr. Jefferson says, "One nation could most of all disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition we detach her from the bonds, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke which might otherwise linger long in doubt and and difficulty" (here referring of course to South America). "Great Britain is the nation who can do us the most harm of any on all the earth, and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. *With her, then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once*

more side by side in the same cause. . . . But I am clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion that it would prevent instead of provoking war." From these abstracts it is seen how closely Mr. Jefferson's advice was followed by Mr. Monroe, and also how impossible it would be for Mr. Monroe to recognize his own declaration of 1823 now that the modern expansion patent of 1881 has been taken out on it.

The *North American Review* writer, after expanding the Monroe Doctrine until vaulting ambition bears him beyond the farthest fixed star of common sense, exclaims, "Touching the two great oceans which divide the world, this republic should, like the Roman Janus, have two faces regarding both Europe and Asia and the islands interposed."

Now, as Australia consists of islands, and Africa has technically become an island since the cutting of the Suez Canal, it would seem that the *North American Review* writer beheld in his vision the beneficent rule of the United States extended over all the earth! But could a more fatal illustration have been more fatuously chosen? Two-facedness is accounted a monstrosity in both the moral and physical world. The doors to the blood-stained Janus temple being always closed in time of peace, it was only when war had swung them wide that the two dread faces could look forth, and gloat on the slayer and the slain. One analogy sometimes bears another in its bosom. God forbid that the

United States should know a fate like that which befell the republic of Rome!

But the *North American Review* article is not a unique phenomenon of the mania which seeks to resurrect and expand the Monroe Doctrine. Indeed in the preceding February, the United States' Congress passed a resolution little less erratic. It resolved:—

1. "That the establishment of any form of protectorate or by any Powers of Europe over any independent States of this continent, or the introduction from any quarter of a scheme or policy which would carry with it the right to any European Power to interfere with their concerns, or to control in any other manner their destiny, or to transfer to any such power by conquest, cession, or acquisition in any other way of these States, or any portion thereof, is a measure to which the Government has in the declaration of President Monroe, in his message of December 2nd, 1823, and known as the Monroe Doctrine, avowed its opposition; and which, should the attempt be made, it will regard and treat as dangerous to our peace, prosperity, and safety.

2. "That it is the interest and right of the United States to have possession, direction, control, and government of any canal, railroad, or other artificial communication to be constructed across the Isthmus connecting the American continent, for the transfer of cargoes from the Caribbean Sea

to the Pacific Ocean, whether the same be built or constructed at Panama, Nicaragua, or elsewhere, and in view of the magnitude of this interest, *it is the duty of the United States to insist that it shall be built, and by whomsoever the same may be commenced, prosecuted, or completed, and whatever the nationality of its corporation or source of their capital, that the interest of the United States, and their right to possess and control the same, will be asserted and maintained whenever in their opinion it becomes necessary.*

3. "That the President be requested to take the steps necessary for the abrogation of any existing treaties, whose terms are in conflict with this declaration of principles."

The last paragraph is evidently and specially aimed at the Clayton-Bulwer Convention, signed April 19th, 1850, and ratified July 4th of the same year.

The condition of the United States had greatly improved since the days of President Monroe. Its population and territory had doubled, the Holy Alliance was extinct, the whole of Europe was exhausted by the revolution, and England, the ally of 1823, now obstructed the ambitions of the United States in the Isthmus. One United States company had secured from Colombia exclusive right to construct, and were already engaged in building, the Panama railway, and another company had secured similar rights to build an

interoceanic canal through Nicaragua, *viâ* the San Juan River—in fact a special convention had been signed. England had for years exercised undisputed protection over the greater part of the eastern coast of the Isthmus, especially over Mosquitia—including the mouth of the San Juan River, whose kings were crowned by the governors of Jamaica.

England's response to the (Hise-Selva) Convention was the assertion, by the British consul at New York, of an exclusive claim for the Mosquito Indians to the ownership and sovereign jurisdiction over the mouth and lower part of the San Juan River. Then the United States opened negotiations with Lord Palmerston on the subject; but before an understanding was arrived at, a British squadron took possession of the port of San Juan. On the United States' declaration that "they would not, if they could, obtain any exclusive right or privilege in a great highway which naturally belonged to all 'mankind,'" the Clayton-Bulwer Convention was entered into. It consists of nine articles, and provides that neither England nor the United States shall possess exclusive rights over the proposed (Nicaragua) canal; neither shall fortify the canal or its environs, and neither Power shall colonize, rule, or hold protectorate over any portion of Central America. Both Powers engage to invite friendly States "to join them as guarantors of the canal constructed '*for the benefit of mankind*

on equal terms to all;'" and they "determine to give their support and encouragement to such person or company as may first offer to commence the same with the necessary capital and the consent of the local authorities, and on such principles as accord with the spirit and intention of this convention."

Lastly, in order "*to establish a general principle, they* (England and the United States) *hereby agree to extend their protection,* by treaty stipulations, to any other practical communications across the Isthmus, and especially to the interoceanic communications proposed to be established by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama."

Of this treaty, entered into by both parties in order to prevent a possible collision in the Isthmus concerns, the United States now demands the abolition at all hazards, as being unjust to the United States, unfit for the times, an obstacle to peaceful relations and opposed to the very spirit of progress. Previous efforts have been made to upset this convention; for example, the Crampton-Webster arrangement in 1852; the Dallas-Clarendon treaty of 1854; the Cass-Yrisarri treaty of 1857, &c.; and so bitter was the feeling in 1881, that, in the discussion in the House of Representatives (Feb. 26th, 1881) over the appropriation of £40,000 for the establishment of coaling stations on the Isthmus, Congressman Ellis, in approving the measure as "an acquisition to American power,"

and an "assertion of a determination to dominate upon this continent," exclaimed, "I would break through the shackles of the unequal treaty—the Clayton-Bulwer treaty;" and on being challenged by another congressman as to his meaning, Mr. Ellis reiterated, "Certainly, I would give England notice that we do not intend to be bound by it." And the vote for the appropriation was 114—85.

Since 1880, the United States have established coaling stations on islands in the Laguna de Chiriqui, within a few hours' sail of the Atlantic opening of the Panama Canal and another station in the Golfito, a trifle higher up on the opposite side of the Isthmus and commanding the Pacific inlet of the canal.

Dr. Moritz Wagner, in "Petermann's Geographische Mittheilungen," gives some fine descriptions of these harbours, and Admiral Farragut, who visited them in 1860, says, in his exhaustive report to President Lincoln, that "they are the only good harbours with deep and well-protected waters on the entire American isthmus," and that because of "inexhaustible coalfields" between both harbours; because the Chiriqui Lagoon could be "fortified to absolute impregnability," and the Golfito is naturally "stronger than Gibraltar," &c. The possession of these harbours would secure to any power "the key of commerce and the point of naval command in the republican tropical world."

And the United States, deaf to the protests of

the little States to whom these ports belong, is fortifying these strongholds and negotiating for the abolition of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

As an instance of the tactless and insincere methods of the United States Secretary of State (Mr. Blaine), I cannot forbear citing the following from his lengthy dispatches to Minister Lowell on this subject. On June 4th, 1881, Mr. Blaine wrote:—"The policy of the United States is one of peace and friendly intercourse with every government and people. This disposition is abundantly shown in the fact that our armaments by land and sea are kept within such limits as afford no ground for distrust, or suspicion of menace to other nations." Six months later, in his dispatch (Dec. 16th, 1881), Mr. Blaine less pacifically declares that "the military power of the United States, as shown by the recent civil war, is without limit, and, in any conflict *on the American continent, practically irresistible;*" and he demanded a neat modification of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in these terms: "The following is a summary of the changes necessary to meet the views of this government:—1. Every part of the treaty which forbids the United States fortifying the canal and holding political control of it in conjunction with the country in which it is located, is to be cancelled. 2. Every part of the treaty in which the United States and Great Britain agree to make no acquisition of territory in Central America is to remain in full force."

The position in which the United States stands towards the canal project to-day may be summed up in these points:—There exists no canal treaty between the sovereign republics of the United States and Colombia; the United States has therefore neither obligations nor rights as regards construction or control of the Panama Canal, and Colombia can conclude treaties of whatever nature and with whom she will within her sovereign rights for the construction of a canal.

The "Monroe Doctrine," a useful instrument in its time, but necessarily wholly temporary in its intention and character, is without relation or reference to or vitality of any sort in the present.

The United States commits a breach of international courtesy and violates the independence of Costa Rica and Colombia in making surveys and establishing coaling stations on both their territories against their express wishes; thus violating also the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which stipulates that neither power shall hold territory on the Isthmus, and prescribes joint action in any isthmian canal project encouraging its building and seeking to make it an international concern. What the United States' relation to the canal question may become is not easy of surmise; but what they ought to be is surely most timely and serious matter for consideration.

Violations and perversions of treaties have not become axioms of State policy in the United States, and we must believe that the people will yet be

roused to a sense of the wrong done in its name by that Midas brood, who seeing only selfish losses in the great general gain to come from the opening of the canal, cry *pereat mundus* if only their colossal wealth may increase.

It cannot be that the United States would push her purpose to control the canal to the point of war. There are many great divisions within the States, and it is not likely that the country would be unanimous in entering upon so desperate a venture. With all due respect for such authoritative assurances as Mr. Blaine's of the "practical irresistibility" of the United States' forces on American soil, there are grounds for fearing that she might not succeed in such a conflict. A refusal by the canal company and bondholders to transfer their interests in the canal to the United States, and a subsequent attempt on or seizure of the canal by the United States, might prove an irreparable calamity. We see the power exercised on the respective governments in the present Egyptian difficulty, and their demands for government protection of their interests in the Panama Canal would certainly not be ignored when to this is added the yearly deepening complaints of the merchants and manufacturers all over the world, that the United States floods all the markets of the world with her own products, while at the same time closing her borders to imports by an almost prohibitory tariff.

Besides these considerations, England, France,

Italy, Germany, Mexico, China and Chili, who have all of them their grievances against certain official actions of the United States, might make a concerted demand of such a nature as to leave to the United States no alternative but surrender of all exclusive claims on the canal, or war. If she yielded, her reputation would have suffered grievously, and a dangerous and lasting tension, productive of much and various trouble, would have been evoked, and the canal might become fundamentally a non-United States concern.

As to war, what more fatuous course could be recommended? It would be a contest for United States' interests in the canal, and if it cost more than those interests would be worth, it would certainly not be fought out; it is indeed scarcely conceivable that any right-minded individual or party would council a war against at least two or three other American powers, and England, France, possibly Spain, and not improbably other governments besides.

The United States are certainly not a first-class naval Power, and even though they should build, according to Lieutenant-Commander Gorringe's advice (*North American Review*, May, 1882), "a large number of exceptionally swift cruisers," and use them in the infamous work he designates, namely, the destroying of every British vessel intercepted, it would not as he so easily deducts "soon bring Great Britain to terms."

But perhaps the ingenious wielder of Cleopatra's

dainty needle has invented some self-generating combustible in lieu of coal, or some propulsive power superior to that of the fleetest British keels?

And Great Britain is only one of certainly more than two Powers who would then be warring with the United States, and if the latter cannot by sea hold control of the canal, there is still less chance of success by land.

Though she could gather a million troops on the Rio Grande (a rather expensive measure), and cut her way through a hostile Républica Mexicana well furnished with European gold and officers, an impossible feat, could the communications be kept up, provisions and ammunition secured, while journeying over thousands of miles in miasmatic swamps and wilderness through Central America?

Meanwhile a sufficient corps of observation would be needed on the Canadian frontier to prevent inroads from some six hundred thousand well-drilled and equipped militia, augmented as they would be by all available troops and officers from England.

Again, should a ferment of national jealousies, internal disorders and revolutions, preclude the offering of immediate armed resistance to the United States' attack on the canal, could it be argued that such resistance would never be made? If not, the United States would need to be perpetually prepared for such an emergency, and would not the cost in lives, money and rancour be too high a price?

Even though no Power or Powers could interfere effectively, yet so long as the United States held the canal against the desire of the Great Powers, that tenure would be fruitful of infinite and permanent complications, and it is indeed doubtful if under such conditions the canal would pay.

But even allowing that circumstances so favour the United States that the protection and control of the canal demanded by her are acquiesced in by the great and small maritime Powers of the world, what is gained? She will be held responsible for everything in connection with the canal by everybody, and she must somehow please everybody if she will escape trouble. The first and absolute requisite to that end will be that she commands the respect of the Powers; and from her dealings in this question there is but one kind of respect that she can get, and that is the one for superior force. She must, therefore, in a large measure become a military Power.

It would seem that the only reasonable, safe and profitable course for the United States to pursue in this question, would be to abide by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, give up her coaling-stations and intrigues on the Isthmus, encourage the brave and great work of M. de Lesseps, and seek in harmony with England and France to secure an international guarantee for the permanent safety and effectiveness of the canal.

"Her Majesty's Government," said Lord Granville, in his despatch to Mr. West, last January,

"believe that the extension of an invitation to all maritime States to participate in an engagement based on the stipulations of the Convention of 1850, would obviate any objection that may possibly be raised against it as not being adequate in its present condition for the purpose for which it was designed. This course formed the basis of Mr. Fish's proposal to Dr. Cardenas, the Nicaraguan Minister, in 1877, and Her Majesty's Government would gladly see the United States again take the initiative in an invitation to the Powers, and will be prepared either to join in it or to support and endorse it in the way that may be found most fitting and convenient, provided it does not conflict in any way with the Clayton-Bulwer treaty."

AXEL GUSTAFSON.

LONDON, *July*, 1882.

LONDON: G. NORMAN AND SON, PRINTERS, HART STREET, COVENT GARDEN.

3 2044 019 365 832

This book should be returned to the Library on or before the last date stamped below.
A fine of five cents a day is incurred by retaining it beyond the specified time.
Please return promptly.

WIDENER
JUN 1 0 1997
CANCELLED

WIDENER
SEP 1 8 1997
CANCELLED

WIDENER
FEB 0 8 2002
CANCELLED

WIDENER
JAN 1 2 2006
BOOK DUE